In less than two years Gen. David Petraeus has become the most admired American general of recent times. His success in overseeing America's military surge in Iraq, reversing the country's descent into a sectarian bloodbath, has earned him praise from both contenders in America's presidential race.
He is a "great general" in the view of John McCain, and has "done a brilliant job" according to Barack Obama. Given his intelligence, ambition and deft handling of the media, the general is talked of as a possible future president.
Gen. David Petraeus
First, though, he has some more soldiering to do. As he has left Iraq to take over Central Command later this month, presiding over operations from Egypt to Afghanistan, his views will do much to shape the course of the "war on terror" under the next president.
He faces a persistent question: can his Iraqi success be replicated in Afghanistan?
As security has improved in Iraq, it has worsened in Afghanistan. And as the surge of forces comes to an end in Iraq, there are calls for a similar one in Afghanistan. In its dying days, the Bush administration has ordered a full review of policy in Afghanistan.
Gen. Petraeus took part in lengthy high-level meetings in London and Paris last month, and in August he brainstormed with Pakistan's top brass on an American aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean.
He says his tactics in Iraq cannot simply be transposed to Afghanistan. Indeed, there are big differences: Iraq is far richer, has a greater density of both American and local forces, its command is more unified, and insurgents enjoy nothing like the cross-border safe havens that the Taliban has in Pakistan's tribal belt.
The scale of any surge in Afghanistan will depend on the speed of withdrawal from Iraq. A brigade originally destined for Iraq early next year will be diverted to Afghanistan. But commanders in Afghanistan have asked for three more brigades on top of that.
Having built his reputation in Iraq, Gen. Petraeus will resist a big withdrawal from the country that risks endangering his hard-won achievements. The progress in Iraq, he says, is still fragile and reversible; he will probably want to keep a substantial American presence there at least until late 2010.
In Afghanistan, for now, the Americans are trying to make better use of the troops they have. Gen. David McKiernan, the NATO commander, is in the process of being "double-hatted" as commander of America's separate and more muscular "Operation Enduring Freedom."
He will also oversee the training of Afghan forces. This should ensure greater unity of command, though some American special forces, whose actions have at times caused controversy over the death of civilians, will continue to operate separately.
NATO is still plagued by the reluctance of many allies to join the fight and the inability of others to bring more resources. The Dutch and Canadians are expected to stop fighting in the next two years.
America has belatedly decided to support the expansion of the Afghan army from 80,000 to 130,000 (still far smaller than Iraq's). Allies that do not supply troops or equipment will be asked for money, trainers and advisers for the Afghan army.
In Iraq, the surge's success was not just due to extra forces. Political changes were crucial, especially the decision by Sunni tribes to switch sides and the cease-fire declared by the biggest Shiite militia, the Mahdi Army.
For Gen. Petraeus, this virtuous circle was not a matter of luck but sustained by a transformation in military doctrine that he developed when he ran the army's think tank at Fort Leavenworth, published in a new counter-insurgency manual in December 2006 and implemented when he took command in Iraq soon after. Soldiers were told their priority was not just to find and kill terrorists but to protect and win over the civilians.
Gen. Petraeus's thinking on counter-insurgency is distilled in 25 pithy maxims, the latest version of which was issued in July. It tells subordinates that "the Iraqi people are the decisive terrain" and that soldiers must live among them and patrol on foot: "You can't commute to this fight."
Force alone cannot succeed: "We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor." Instead, insurgents must gradually be crushed from all directions -- military, intelligence, politics, development, the media and much more. He calls this the Anaconda Strategy. Quoting Seneca the Younger, he says, "Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity."
Much of this thinking has been tried by American forces in Afghanistan, but a shortage of resources, poor coordination and unrest in Pakistan have helped send Afghanistan on a downward spiral.
Noting the recent fighting by Pakistan's army in the Bajaur tribal region, Gen. Petraeus has expressed his belief -- perhaps just a hope -- that the country's leaders are ready to deal with violent militants as a mortal threat to Pakistan itself, not just to Afghanistan.
He has also let it be known that he sees promise in trying to woo "reconcilable" Afghan tribes, as he did with the "awakening" of Sunni tribes in Iraq.
But success in Afghanistan is uncertain and could take many years. The general has probably yet to work out a strategy for his new area. But his own principles conclude with a warning. "Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and that what works in one area may not work in another."
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